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I.
INTRODUCTION
In the sixteenth century, the Spanish Empire was larger and "more
powerful than any other European state since the Roman Empire.", A
historian of that time period said, "[t]he sun never sets on the dominion of
the King of Spain." 2 Tax historian Charles Adams asserted that Imperial
Spain's failure to reform its tax system significantly contributed to its
demise.3 Oxford's leading scholar on Imperial Spain described Spain's
taxes as follows:
[S]panish industry was strangled by the most burdensome
and complicated system of taxation that human folly can
devise . . . .The taxpayer, overburdened with imposts,
was entangled with a network of regulations to prevent
evasion . . . .He was thus crippled at every step by the
deadly influence of the anomalous and incongruous

accumulation of exactions .4
Today's international transfer pricing' rules resemble Imperial Spain's tax
system. Although no modern nation can boast that the sun never sets on
its domain, many multinational enterprise (MNE) groups can. MNE
groups are the engine of global commerce and local prosperity. 6 Imperial
Spain's fate admonishes nations to balance their sovereign right to tax with
uniform and predictable tax treatment of MNE groups.'
(1993).

1.

CHARLES ADAMS, FOR GOOD AND EVIL 185

2.

Id.

3.

Id.

4.

Id. at 196 (quoting RETREVOR DAVIES, SPAIN IN DECLINE 1621-1700, at 105 (1957)).

5.

"Transfer prices are the prices at which an enterprise transfers physical goods and

intangible property or provides services to associated enterprises." Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development Draft Discussion on Transfer Pricing (OECD, Paris (1994)), reprinted
in 8-9 INTERTAX 314, 318 (1994) [hereinafter OECD Report].
6.

ARNOLD H. WEISS & FERENC E. MOLNAR, TAX POLICY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST

CENTURY 108 (Herbert Stein ed., 1988).
7.

Id.
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Part I of this comment explains transfer pricing, defines the
choices for taxing controlled transactions, and briefly recounts the
development of international transfer pricing rules. Part II reviews recent
developments in the international transfer pricing debate over the arm's
length principle and global formulary apportionment. Part III summarizes
the arguments for and against the use of each standard. Finally, Part IV
proposes that transfer pricing rules should reflect a continuum of both the
arm's length principle and the unitary approach from the comparable
uncontrolled price method (CUP) to formulary apportionment.
II. BACKGROUND
Montesquieu observed that direct taxes on the individual are more
natural to slavery, whereas indirect taxes on transactions are more natural
to liberty. 9 In the United States, the income tax is perceived as an indirect
tax, a tax on the receipt of income.o While the relationship between
liberty and income taxes may seem tenuous, the relationship between
government revenue and income is not. A government's income tax
receipts are directly related to the amount of taxable income within its
taxing jurisdiction. The amount of income is at the heart of transfer
prices.
The amount of income received is equal to the price paid for goods
or services less the cost. When the price of goods or services is
determined by negotiations between independent self-interested enterprises,
the price is said to be determined by the market. The transaction is called
arm's length or uncontrolled because the enterprises are trying to
maximize their respective interests.
For example, assume that Bow
Enterprise and Arrow Enterprise are two uncontrolled corporations dealing
at arm's length. Arrow wants to get the highest price possible for the
arrows it sells and Bow wants to pay as little as possible for the arrows it
needs. Arrow sells 100 arrows at one dollar each to Bow. The market
price for an arrow is one dollar. Arrow receives $100 in income and has
taxable receipts up to $100.
Generally, governments view market
transactions as the norm. Income tax revenue from market transactions is
satisfactory.
However, not all prices are determined by the market. When the
price of goods or services is set by negotiations between related
8.

Formulary apportionment is also known as the unitary approach.
9.
ADAMS, supra note 1, at 278 (quoting BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF LAWS 267
(Thomas Nugent trans., 1991)).
10. Id. at 313. However, in Canada and the United Kingdom, income taxes are classified as
direct taxes. Id.
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enterprises, the price is the intercompany transfer price. The transfer
price may be the market price or it may reflect other interests of the
related group. The transaction is called controlled because enterprises
have the opportunity to maximize the collective interests of the enterprise
group, as well as their own. Tax avoidance is always one of those
interests.
Recall the example in which the market price of an arrow was one
dollar. Now, assume that Arrow Enterprise is a related corporation in the
Bow & Arrow Group. Assume further that Arrow pays lots of taxes on its
income over one dollar, while Bow & Arrow is virtually tax exempt."
Arrow sells 100 arrows at one cent each to Bow & Arrow. The transfer
price for an arrow is one cent. Arrow receives one dollar in income.
Then, Bow & Arrow sells 100 arrows at the market price of one dollar
each and receives $100 in income. Because Arrow's income is not over
one dollar it pays no taxes. And since Bow & Arrow is virtually tax
exempt, it receives $100 basically tax free. Generally, governments view
transfer prices as anomalies when they do not follow market prices.
Income tax revenue from controlled transactions is unsatisfactory to the
extent controlled transactions deviate from market norms.
Governments have two choices for taxing controlled transactions.
They can treat controlled transactions as if they were market transactions,
or they can choose not to tax controlled transactions at all.' 2 If a
government does not tax controlled transactions, they usually treat
controlled enterprise groups as a single business unit for tax purposes.' 3
The first alternative is the arm's length principle and the second is the
unitary approach. The arm's length principle imposes a comparable
market price on controlled transactions. 4
Conversely, the unitary
approach does not try to achieve comparability among transactions. It uses
a formula to apportion income between controlled enterprises."

11.

There are several possible reasons for the tax disparity between Arrow and Bow &

Arrow. For example, differences in Arrow and Bow & Arrow's size, capitalization, or taxing
jurisdiction could account for the difference.
12. Guenter Schindler & David Henderson, IntercorporateTransfer Pricing, 29 TAX NOTES
1171, 1172-73 (1985), reprinted in RICHARD L. KAPLAN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL

TRANSACTIONS 205 (1988).
13. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IRS COULD BETTER PROTECT U.S. TAX
INTERESTS INDETERMINING THE INCOME OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (1981), reprinted in
RICHARD L. KAPLAN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 205 (1988)
[hereinafter UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE].
14. Id.
15.

Id.
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Remember the last example where the market price of an arrow
was one dollar, and the Bow & Arrow Group's transfer price of an arrow
was one cent. Under the arm's length approach, the cofitrolled transaction
between Arrow and Bow & Arrow is treated as if it was a market
transaction for tax purposes. A market price of one dollar is imposed on
the sale of 100 arrows. Therefore, highly taxed Arrow receives up to
$100 in taxable income and virtually tax free Bow & Arrow has no taxable
receipts.
Under the unitary approach, the controlled transaction between
Arrow and Bow & Arrow is not taxed. The Bow & Arrow Group is
treated as a single business unit for tax purposes. After the sale of arrows,
Bow & Arrow Group has $100 in income. A formula using some
combination of property, payroll, and sales as factors is used to apportion
income between Bow & Arrow Group's controlled enterprises.
Since 1921, section 482 has authorized the United States Tax
Commissioner to reallocate income among controlled enterprises using the
arm's length principle.1 6 The states, however, use the unitary approach to
apportion income between multi-state controlled enterprises.
Transfer
pricing decisions take on international dimensions when the related
enterprises are located in different sovereign taxing jurisdictions.17 MNE
groups may manipulate transfer prices to shift income from high tax
jurisdictions to low tax jurisdictions in order to avoid taxes.
In response to the growth in international commerce and the
spread of MNE groups, countries began to evaluate their tax legislation
with regard to transfer pricing. In 1968, the United States Treasury issued
new arm's length transfer pricing regulations under section 482. At the
same time, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
Committee (OECD) on Fiscal Affairs began work in this area. In 1979,
the OECD published transfer pricing guidelines which endorsed the arm's
length principle. These guidelines were followed by two OECD reports on
transfer pricing in 1984 and 1992. OECD guidelines form the basis of
several member countries' national tax legislation." Since 1980, France,
Italy, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Korea, Canada, Australia,
and the United States have published new or revised transfer pricing
9
rules. ,
16. RICHARD L. KAPLAN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 166

(1988).
17. Over 50% of international transactions are between related parties. Helmut Becker, The
New OECD Report on Transfer Pricing-A FirstOverview and Comment, 8-9 INTERTAX 356 (1994).
18.

Id.

19. Id.
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III. DEVELOPMENTS
Part II summarizes three major developments in the area of
international transfer pricing in 1994.10 In June, the United States Supreme
Court decided Barclays Bank v. FranchiseBoard of California2' In June,
the OECD released a partial draft of a report that will revise the 1979
OECD Report on Transfer Pricing.Y In July, the United States Treasury
Department also published the final version of the transfer pricing
regulations under section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code.23

A. The Barclays Bank Decision
In Barclays Bank, the United States Supreme Court held that
California's formulary apportionment method' as applied to MNE groups
with in-state operations did not violate the Commerce and Due Process
Clauses of the United States Constitution.Y Although the Barclays Bank
decision does not address federal transfer pricing rules, the opinion implies
that Congress could adopt federal unitary taxation under section 482.26
The Court emphasized that Congress, not the Executive, constitutionally
determines the United States foreign commercial policy. 27 The Court also
implied that the United States international tax policy was a political
question outside the scope of the Supreme Court's Article III jurisdiction.u
Furthermore, the Court put formula apportionment on the same
constitutional plane as the arm's length principle. The Court held that
California's tax passed due process scrutiny because "[riules governing
international multi-jurisdictional income allocation have an inescapable
imprecision given the complexity of the subject matter." 29 The Court also

20. J. David B. Oliver, Unitary Taxation: the Denouement?, 3 EC TAX REV. 73 (1994).
21. 114 U.S. at 2268 (1994).
22. OECD Report, supra note 5, at 314.
23. I.R.C. § 482 (1994).
24. California's corporate franchise tax was determined by a "worldwide combined reporting"
method. Barclays Bank, 114 U.S. at 2271. This method attributed a portion of the taxpayer's
worldwide income to California based on "the average of the proportions of worldwide payroll,
property, and sales located in California" Id. at 2272.
25. Id.
26. J. Dwight Evans, With Barclays and Colgate Settled, Worldwide Formulary Reporting
Goes Federal, TAX NOTES INT'L, Oct. 12, 1994, availablein LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNI File
(§ 482 gives the Secretary of the Treasury the general right to "apportion" income, however, §
482 does not specify a particular method of apportionment); I.R.C. § 482 (1986).
27. Barclays Bank, 114 U.S. at2285.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 2279.
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held that formulary apportionment was as effective as the arm's length
principle in avoiding double taxation. 0 The Supreme Court's validation of
state unitary taxation has provided support for federal global formulary
apportionment.3 1
B. The OECD Draft Report on Transfer Pricing
Conversely, the OECD has reaffirmed the arm's length principle
as the international standard and has expressly rejected global formulary
apportionment as an alternative in its draft report on transfer pricing .32
Part I of the report, Principles and Methods, has been released in draft
form for public comment, as work continues on Part II, Applications, and
Part III, Special Topics." Part I of the draft report states the arm's length
principle and explains why it is superior to the unitary approach. ' It
discusses general application of the arm's length standard and describes
transaction-based methods.3- Part I also describes other methods and their
3
relative usefulness in realizing the arm's length principle.
1. The Arm's Length Principle
The OECD draft report relies on paragraph one of Article 9 of the
OECD Model Tax Convention7 as the authoritative statement of the arm's
length principle. 8 The Model Tax Convention provides that
[When] conditions are made or imposed between ..
two
[associated] enterprises in their commercial or financial
relations which differ from those which would be made
between independent enterprises, then any profits which
would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the
enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so

30. Id. at 2280 (citing Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 193 (1983)).
31.

Evans, supra note 26, at 229.

32.

OECD Report, supra note 5, at 325 para. 31.

33. Id. at 314-15. Part I was issued for public comment in July 1994.
with Part II in 1995. Part III is expected to be available at the end of 1996.
34

Id.

35

Id.

36.

See Becker, supra note 17, at 356.

It will be finalized

37. The OECD Model Convention forms the basis of bilateral tax treaties among OECD
member and some non-member countries. OECD Report, supra note 5, at 323 para. 23.
38.

Id.
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accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise
and taxed accordingly.19
The report's reasons for adopting the arm's length principle and rejecting
the unitary approach will be described in Part II of this comment.
°
Next, the report discusses factors determining comparability.
The arm's length principle requires the comparison of a controlled
transaction with an uncontrolled transaction to determine an arm's length
price.4 1 The accuracy of the arm's length price depends on the degree of
comparability among the transactions.42 In this regard, the report
determines to what extent several transactional factors, such as risk and
43
business strategies, effect the comparability of the transactions.
2. Transaction-Based Methods
The report also discusses three types of transaction-based methods:
the CUP method, the resale price method (RPM), and the cost plus
method. The CUP method estimates an arm's length price from a
comparable uncontrolled transaction." If the CUP method is inapplicable,
then the RPM may be useful.4 5 The resale price method is the price at
which a good that has been bought from an associated enterprise is resold
to an independent enterprise." Then, the resale price is reduced by a
comparable uncontrolled profit margin to work back to an arm's length
price.4 7 However, if the CUP method is inapplicable, the cost plus method
may be useful. The cost plus method starts with the costs incurred by a
member of an associated enterprise." Then, a comparable uncontrolled
mark-up is added to that cost to achieve an arm's length price.49
Even though the report encourages flexibility in the application of
methods, it clearly favors transaction-based methods.? The report takes
the position that transaction-based methods are the "most direct means" of
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 325 para. 32.
OCED Report, supra note 5, at 325 para. 32.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 326 para. 36.
Id.
Id. at 339 para. 100.
Id. at 338 para. 100.
OECD Report, supra note 5, at 339 para. 101.
Id. at 342 para. 115.
Id. at 342 para. 116.
Id. at 336 para. 85.
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establishing an arm's length price.5 Therefore, transaction-based methods
should be used where they can be "reliably applied. 5'

2

The report states

that the CUP method is "preferable over all methods" where it is
applicable. 3 The CUP method applies where controlled and uncontrolled
transactions are identical or where "reasonably accurate adjustments" can
eliminate differences.5

3. Other Methods
If a transaction-based method is inapplicable, then other methods
may be used as a "last resort.""5 These other methods include the profit56
split method, the comparable profits method (CPM), or multiple methods.
Under the profit-split method, the associated enterprise strives to achieve
the same profit an uncontrolled enterprise would have achieved." The
report suggests a profit-split arm's length price can be achieved using a
contribution analysis, a residual analysis, or any other appropriate
method.5

A contribution analysis divides profits among members of the
controlled group in relation to the value of their functions performed. 9 In
contrast, a residual analysis has two steps. First, the controlled group is
allocated a profit based on a comparable uncontrolled basic rate of return.61
Second, the profit remaining after the first stage is further allocated among
the controlled group in a way an uncontrolled enterprise distributes
profits.6 Finally, the CPM compares the operating profits of a comparable
uncontrolled enterprise.62 Comparability of operating profits is essential
under the CPM. 6
The draft report acknowledges serious difficulties in applying
profit methods. For example, profit methods may be applied where
comparable uncontrolled data is unavailable, or uncontrolled transactions
51.

Id. at 345 para. 128.

52.

OECD Report, supra note 5, at 345 para. 128.

53. See id.
at 336 para. 84-86, 337 para. 93.
54. Id. at 337 para. 93.
55.

Id. at 352 para. 172.

56. Id. at 345 para. 128-29.
57.

OECD Report, supra note 5, at 347 para. 140.

58. Id. at 347 para. 142.
59. Id. at 353 para. 143.
60.

Id. at 348 para. 146.

61.

Id.

62.

OECD Report, supra note 5, at 349 para. 153.

63.

Id.
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cannot be reasonably adjusted." Also, profit methods reach an arm's
length result "only on a case-by-case basis. "65 Nevertheless, the report
maintains that profit methods are consistent with realizing the arm's length
principle." However, the report strongly discourages the use of profit
methods67 and urges "considerable caution" when using them."
C. The United States Treasury Regulations Under Section 482
The United States Treasury regulations on transfer pricing are
consistent with the OECD draft report in that the standard for allocation of
income among commonly controlled enterprises under section 482 remains
"that of an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's length with another
uncontrolled taxpayer."" The final Treasury regulations come after a
series of proposed and temporary regulations issued in order to implement
the "commensurate with income" standard for the transfer of intangible
property enacted in the 1986 Tax Reform Act and generally to improve the
application of transfer pricing rules.10
1. Methods
The regulations include six methods for estimating the arm's length
price for the transfer of tangible property: CUP, RPM, cost-plus, CPM,
profit-split, and any unspecified method.7 1 There are four methods for
estimating the arm's length price for the transfer of intangible property
under the regulations: the comparable uncontrolled transaction method
(CUTM), CPM, profit-split, and any unspecified method.
All the
specified methods are described generally in the summary of the OECD
draft report except the CUTM.7 2 The CUTM estimates the arm's length

64. Id.

65. Id. at 353 para. 177.
66. Id. at 352 para. 172.
67. OECD Report, supra note 5, at 352 para. 172.
68.

Id. at 353 para. 177.

69.

I.R.C. § 482 (1986).

70.

I.R.C. § 482 (1986).

71. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(b) (1986) (discussing the rules relating to the CUP); Treas.
Reg. § 1.482-3(c) (discussing the rules relating to the RPM); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(d) (discussing
the rules relating to the cost plus method); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6(c)(2) (describing the comparable
profit-split method and its application).

72. See discussion supra parts III.B2, B3. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(c) (setting forth the rules
relating to the CUTM).

Lester
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price from the price charged in comparable uncontrolled transactions
involving comparable intangibles .7
2. The Best Method Rule
The regulations adopt the "best method" rule for selecting a
method to determine the arm's length price." The best method is the
"most reliable" method under the facts and circumstances.,The
regulations require the taxpayer to document why a particular method is
the best among the alternative methods . 6 Although the best method rule
does not prioritize methods," the regulations implicitly favor the CUP
method and the CUTM because they yield the most reliable results if
sufficient data is available. In this way, the final regulations reflect the
OECD's position that transaction-based methods should be used where

they can be "reliably applied. "78
However, inquiry into the transfer price methods that have been
applied in the United States reveal that methods classified by the OECD as
non-transaction-based were used in more than one-third of all transfer
pricing cases.79 This data reflects the increasing complexity of MNE group
transactions and the difficulty in finding reliable comparable transactions
for the section 482 methods.

3. Advance Pricing Agreements
In response, MNE groups are increasingly requesting advanced
pricing agreements (APAs) to resolve potential transfer pricing disputes.,*
An APA is a negotiated agreement between tax administrators and the
taxpayer. It establishes a transfer pricing methodology to be applied to an

73.

Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(c).

74. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1).
75.

Id.

76.

Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)(1).

77.

Priorities were a large part of previous regulations and generated a lot of controversy.

78. OECD Report, supra note 5, at 345 para. 128.
79. Becker, supra note 17, at 361.

80. Conclusion of an APA usually precludes a Section 482 audit which can result in penalties
and double taxation to the taxpayer. Susan Borkowski, Advance Pricing Agreements and Other
Alternativesfor MultinationalCorporations, 19 INT'L TAX J. 1 (1993). Robert Ackerman, an IRS
director of the APA program, reports that seventy taxpayers are formally in the APA program.

David Brunori estimates that "approximately 15 taxpayers are entering the program every
quarter." David Brunori, Advance Pricing Agreement Program Gets High Marks, 1994 TAX
NOTES INT'L 972, Apr. 11, 1994, available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNI File.
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allocation of income among associated enterprises in advance of the
transaction.'
In October, the United States, Canada, Australia, and Japan agreed
to common procedures for bilateral APAs .
The common procedures
follow the OECD guidelines for transfer pricing methods. 3 Claude
Lemelin, chief of Revenue Canada's transfer pricing section, expects the
4
OECD to include APA procedures in its final transfer pricing report.

D. Steps Toward Global FormularyApportionment
Although the OECD draft report and the United States Treasury
regulations on transfer pricing suggest broad international support for the
arm's length principle, proponents of formulary apportionment have taken
significant steps in the United States." The United States Senate adopted a
Sense of the Senate non-binding resolution recommending the use of
formulary apportionment in certain cases .86 In addition, Senator Byron L.
Dorgan, a Democrat from North Dakota8 7 has "strongly urge[d]" the
Treasury Department to reject the OECD draft report on transfer pricing
because the arm's length standard has contributed to "massive tax
avoidance" by MNE groups in the United States.88 The last time the
Treasury spoke on the issue of transfer pricing methods in 1993, it took
the position that Article 9 of the United States and OECD model treaties

81.

Notice 94-40, 1994-17 I.R.B. 1.

82. Id.
83. Julianne MacKinnon, APA's moving Toward Multilateral Approach, IFA Panelists say,
TAX NOTES INT'L, Dec. 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNI File.
84. Id.
85. Paul R. McDaniel, NAFTA and Formulary Apportionment:An Exploration of the Issues, 3
INTERTAX 105 (1994) (supporting exploring the issues relevant to unitary taxation for NAFTA).
86. John Turro, TN! Interviews Senator Byron L. Dorgan on FormularyApportionment, TAX
NOTES INT'L, Dec. 19, 1994, available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNI File.
87. Id. Senator Dorgan served as North Dakota's State Tax Commissioner for over twenty
years. North Dakota is a unitary tax state. After twelve years in the United States House of
Representatives he was elected to the United States Senate in 1992. He is a member of the
Commerce Committee, the Joint Economic Committee and others.
88. Byron L. Dorgan, Sen., Letter to Secretary of the Treasury Lloyd Bentsen, in Dorgan
Tells Treasury to Reject OECD Draft on Transfer Pricing, TAX NOTES INT'L, Sept. 30, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNI File. The Multi-state Tax Commission (MTC) supports
Senator Dorgan's position. See MTC Commends Sen. Dorgan and Addresses Apportionment of
Foreign Corporate Income, TAX NOTES INT'L, Aug. 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, Taxana
Library, TNI File. The MTC pledged to constructively debate "formulary apportionment as a
basic element of a system for dividing income internationally." Id.
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prevent the United States from using formulary apportionment.9 But,
Senator Dorgan said he will attempt to block proposed tax treaties with
Sweden, France, and Canada if the Treasury maintains this position.9
Senator Dorgan also said he will reintroduce his Foreign Tax Compliance
Act with a sense of the Congress Resolution supporting the use of unitary
methods."
IV.

CONVENTIONAL ARGUMENTS

Helmut Becker, a partner in Deloitte & Touche Germany, said,
"[Tihe new OECD report . . . clearly states that Global [formulary
apportionment] Methods are not in accordance with the arm's length
principle (No. 179 through 194). There is nothing more to say. " 9 Is
Helmut Becker right? Part IV of this comment reviews arguments for and
against the use of the arm's length principle and global formulary
apportionment.
A. Criticism of the Arm's Length Principle
1. Theoretical Arguments
The arm's length principle has been criticized for theoretical,
empirical, and administrative reasons.
The OECD's draft report
acknowledges that the arm's length principle is perceived as "inherently
flawed" because it does not account for the economic realities created by
associated enterprises. The separate entity approach fails to consider
factors like economies of scale and synergistic operations."
In addition, Michael J. McIntyre, professor of law at Wayne State
University, disputes the OECD's claim that the arm's length principle
achieves tax parity for all transactions among controlled and uncontrolled
enterprises.? He uses the principle of horizontal equity to show that the
arm's length standard does not always achieve this measure of tax
fairness." Horizontal equity is advanced where an income tax system
89. John Turro, United States Opponents of Arm's Length Keep Formulary Apportionment
Alive, TAX NOTES INT'L, available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNI File, 9 TNI 1883 [hereinafter
"Keep Formulary Apportionment Alive"].
90.

Id.

Id.
92. Becker, supra note 17, at 361.
91.

93.

OECD Report, supra note 5, at 324 para. 26.

94.

MICHAEL J. MCINTYRE, INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAX RULES OF THE UNITED STATES

5-31 (1989).
95.

Id.
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"imposes equal tax burdens on.. . taxpayers who have equal amounts of
income. "96
According to McIntyre, the arm's length principle would advance
horizontal equity if two conditions are met. First, there must be a
reasonably reliable and comparable uncontrolled market price. Second,
the income earned from a series of controlled group transactions must
equal the income earned from a series of comparable uncontrolled group
transactions.9 If these conditions are not met, then there is no basis to
determine if horizontal equity is achieved because the taxpayers do not
have equal amounts of income.
McIntyre asserts that the arm's length principle does not meet the
first condition because of the nature of the marketplace. A market price is
the outcome of unique negotiations." It may be possible to know the price
range, but it is impossible to know the actual market price unless a market
transaction occurs." As the price range narrows, there is a greater
probability that the arm's length price will approximate the market price.
The arm's length principle will generally fail to achieve a comparable
market price for "intangible" transactions because they are unique.' °° The
unique nature of these transactions creates a wide price range which makes
the market price uncertain. 101
On the other hand, the arm's length principle will generally
achieve a comparable market price for "commodity-type" transactions
because they are standard.'2 The standard nature of these transactions
creates a narrow price range which makes the market price more certain.103
Therefore, the arm's length principle reaches a comparable uncontrolled
market price that is reasonably reliable for standard transactions where the
price range is narrow and the market price is certain. ,04
McIntyre asserts that the arm's length principle also does not meet
05
the second condition because of the nature of controlled enterprises.
Controlled enterprises create "special" operating advantages which are

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 5-32.
Id. at 5-31.
MCNTYRE, supra note 94, at 5-33.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
McINTYRE, supra note 94.
Id.
Id.
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difficult to value.'" Again, the arm's length principle generally fails for
controlled transactions because the special advantages created by these
transactions are unique or immeasurable. °7 The arm's length principle
works best for transactions where the special advantages are minimal or
ascertainable.log Therefore, the income earned from a series of transactions
by a controlled group will approach the income earned from a series of
comparable transactions by an uncontrolled group as the special operating
advantages of the controlled enterprises decrease or become measurable.
McIntyre implies that the arm's length principle approaches tax parity only
for those transactions where it can estimate equal income among
taxpayers. 109
2. Empirical Arguments
Empirical evidence suggests that the arm's length principle has
resulted in the avoidance of United States taxes. Senator Dorgan asserts
that IRS studies show that the United States loses at least $2 billion a year
through tax evasion under the arm's length principle." 0 James Wheeler,
Professor of Accounting at the University of Michigan, estimated that
foreign MNE groups operating in the United States cheat the United States
Treasury out of about $30 million tax dollars each year.", He estimated
that foreign MNE groups in the 1980s had a rate of return on their pretax
United States assets around eight percent, yet their tax reports indicated a
rate of return of "slightly more than one half of one percent."" 2 In
addition, an empirical study for the years 1977-1982 concluded that United
States MNE groups shift income internationally."' The study found "that
United States manufacturing firms with subsidiaries in low tax countries have
relatively low United States tax payments per dollar of assets or sales.
Furthermore, having a subsidiary in a high tax region is associated with
higher United States tax payments. "" Although changes in transfer pricing
rules over the past eight years may have effected tax enforcement efforts,
adherence to the arm's length principle has remained constant.
106.

Id. at 5-34.

107. Id. at 5-35.
108. MCINTYRE, supra note 94.
109.

Id.

110. Turro, supra note 86, at 2.
111. Larry Franko et al., The InternationalTax Showdown, 20 INT'L TAX J. 1, 12 (1994).
112. Id.

113. David Harris et al.,
Income Shifting in US MultinationalCorporations,STUD. IN INT'L.
TAX. 277 (1993).
114. Id.
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3. Practical Arguments
The OECD does not address the issue of tax evasion, but it does
admit that application of the arm's length principle can be an
overwhelming administrative burden for both the tax administrator and
taxpayer.-5 "[Y]ou have to be somewhat of a rocket scientist to figure all
[the transfer pricing rules] out," said Kevin Dolan, a partner at Weil,
Gotshal & Manges and former IRS Associate Chief Counsel.11 6 Senator

Dorgan believes that the use of APAs are like "signing a confession that
11 7
the arm's length approach doesn't work."

MNE groups increasingly engage in transactions for which there
are no uncontrolled comparisons. "8 For example, MNE group transactions
are involve the "integration of highly specialized goods, in unique
intangibles, and/or in the provision of specialised services."119 These types

of transactions make application of the arm's length principle difficult. 120

B. Benefits of the Arm's Length Principle
The OECD responds that the arm's length principle is "sound" in
theory because it simulates the workings of the open market.' 2' Broad
international consensus for the arm's length principle creates a shared
understanding for transfer pricing methods and reduces the risk of double
taxation.'2 The OECD asserts that the arm's length principle is effective
"in the vast majority of cases."

23

It categorically rejects global formulary

apportionment as a "realistic alternative to the arm's length principle."

124

115. OECD Report, supra note 5, at 324 para 28.
116. D. Kevin Dolan et al., Roundtable Discussion on International Taxation with D. Kevin
Dolan, Stephen E. Shay, andDavid R. Tillinghast, TAX NOTES INT'L, Nov. 30, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library.
117.

Turro, supra note 86, at 3.

118. OECD Report, supra note 5, at 324 para. 28.
119. Id. at 324 para. 25.
120. See id. at 325 para. 29.
121.

Id. at 325 para.

122.

Id. at 325 para. 31.

123.

OECD Report, supra note 5, at 324 para 25.

124. Id. at 351 para. 184.
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C. Criticism of Global FormularyApportionment
1. Theoretical Argument
Global formulary apportionment would treat an MNE group
engaged in controlled transactions as a single business unit for tax
purposes.'5 It would allocate the MNE group's global profits among the
associated enterprises in different taxing jurisdictions on the basis of a
predetermined formula.'12 Global formulary apportionment would require
international cooperation in ascertaining the unitary business, determining
global profits, and establishing the tax formula. 2 7 The OECD criticizes
formulary methods as arbitrary because they allocate profits with no sound
relationship to market conditions or the facts surrounding the transaction. '2
2. Practical Arguments
Another basic criticism of the unitary approach is that it is a
"design for disagreement." 2 9
Opponents assert that formulary
apportionment is a "statutory structure" that has no meaning until all the
details are filled in, and it provides no guidance on what the appropriate
details should be.'30 The OECD warns that reaching international
agreement on the details would be "time-consuming and extremely
difficult."3

'

Implementation of a unitary system "[wiould present

enormous political and administrative complexity and require a level of
international cooperation that is unrealistic to expect in the field of
international taxation."3 2

Disagreement between tax administrators and

taxpayers could be a problem too. MNE groups could avoid taxes to the
extent that components of the formula can be manipulated by shifting the
factors of production from high to low tax jurisdictions. 33' Also, any new
tax rule may contain unforeseen loopholes with the potential for lost tax
revenue. 134
125.

UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 13, at 205.

126.

OECD Report, supra note 5, at 353 para. 181.

127. Id. A possible formula might include some proportion of sales, payroll and assets.
William J. Wilkins et al., Memorandum to Congress: You Wouldn't Like Worldwide Formula

Apportionment, TAX NOTES INT'L, Dec. 8, 1994, available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNI File.
128. OECD Report, supra note 5, at 354 para. 189.
129. Wilkins, supra note 127, at 4.
130.

Id.

131.
132.
133.
134.

OECD Report, supra note 5, at 354 para. 186.
Id. at 351 para. 187.
Id. at 354 para. 188.
Wilkins, supra note 127, at 5.
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Some experienced tax practitioners believe that existing problems
with formulary apportionment at the state level in the United States will
become exacerbated if it is applied worldwide. 31 "Inconsistency flourishes
at the state level, despite the relative cultural and political homogeneity of
the states, the restrictions imposed by the United States Constitution, and
established formal mechanisms devoted to achieving uniformity." 3' A lack
of international coordination would increase the risk of double taxation.
Also, exchange rate movements would cause wide fluctuations in tax
determinations under the unitary approach.' 3
Furthermore, the
international community's negative response to the United States Supreme
Court's Barclays Bank decision caution against the use of global formulary
apportionment. I
D. Benefits of Global FormularyApportionment
Advocates of the unitary approach argue that global formulary
apportionment reflects economic reality by treating MNE groups on a
consolidated basis.' 39 They believe that the strength of formulary
apportionment is that it eliminates many of the problems associated with
the arm's length principle. '4
For example, comparable uncontrolled
transactions are unnecessary.
Formulary apportionment reduces the
administrative burden on taxpayers because only one set of accounts is
necessary for tax purposes." It also decreases the uncertainty of an audit
and it improves tax compliance. 142 Proponents acknowledge, however, that
international cooperation is required for global formulary apportionment to
work effectively.
V.

UNCONVENTIONAL WISDOM

The preceding discussion reflects the tax community's
conventional wisdom that these two transfer pricing approaches are polar
opposites. Part IV of this comment proposes that transfer pricing rules

135. Id.at 4.
136. Id.
137. OECD Report, supra note 5, at 351 para. 189. Although the arm's length principle is
not immune to exchange rate movements, it is better able to deal with them because it analyzes the
specific facts and circumstances of each taxpayer. Id.
138. Evans, supra note 26, at 3.
139. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 13, at 205.
140. Id.
141. OECD Report, supra note 5,at 354 para. 183.
142. Turro, supra note 86, at 3.

1995]

Lester

should reflect rational tax principles rather than labels. The result is a
continuum of methods from the CUP method to formulary apportionment.
A. Rational Tax Principles
Charles Adams said, "how we tax and spend determines, to a great
extent, whether we are prosperous or poor, free or enslaved, and most
important, good or evil."' 4 3 Hence, our tax principles should consider the
informed judgements of civilization. In The Wealth of Nations, Adam
Smith set out four marks of a bad tax system:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

A tax was bad that required a large bureaucracy for
administration.
A tax was bad that 'may obstruct the industry of the
people. .. .'
A tax was bad that encouraged evasion ....
A tax is bad that puts people through 'odious
examinations of the tax-gatherers, and exposes them
to much unnecessary trouble, vexation, and
oppression .... 'I"

Section 482 resembles the four marks of a bad tax system. First,
Frank Ng, Chief of the IRS Tax Treaty Division, described the IRS's
international enforcement staff as "large" compared to the treaty partners
of the United States.'14 Second, Michael Patton, a partner at Ernst &
Young, estimated that over half the cases pending in the United States Tax
Court involve transfer pricing issues.1'4 Third, much of the transfer pricing
debate on Capitol Hill has been stimulated by concerns over tax evasion. 417
Fourth, an audit exposes the taxpayer to penalties and double taxation.'
This comparison does not imply that formulary apportionment is good and
the arm's length principle is evil. Instead, Adam Smith's observation on
143.

ADAMS, supra note 1, at xxi.

144.

Id. at 286 (quoting Adam Smith).

145. Kathleen Matthews, Major United States Trading PartnersRespond to the United States
Transfer Pricing Regulations, TAX NOTES INT'L, Oct. 24, 1994 available in LEXIS, Taxana
Library, TNI File. The IRS employs 666 international examiners. Id. ADAMS, supra note 1, at
211. Frederick the Great demanded to know why his subjects paid so much tax and his treasury

was so low. To explain the problem, the finance minister handed a piece of ice to the minister
farthest from Frederick and told him to pass it along until it reached His Majesty.
the ice was passed to Frederick, all he got was a wet hand. Id.
146.

Franko, supra note 111, at 2. See also Dolan, supra note 116.

147.

See discussion supra part III.B1.

148.

See discussion supra part III.B1.

months to complete. Borkowski, supra note 80.

By the time

Although APAs are an improvement, one may take
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taxation suggests that it is important to reflect on what is good and bad
about transfer pricing rules."94
B. A Good Tax Gone Bad
1. The Arm's Length Principle
The arm's length principle is a good tax gone bad. The OECD
maintains that "the arm's length principle has . . . [b]een found to work
effectively in the vast majority of cases."'13 The arm's length standard
works best for transactions where there is a reasonably reliable comparable
uncontrolled transaction and a transaction-based method can be used.' In
the vast majority of cases, the arm's length principle is a good tax.
Problems with the arm's length principle increase as comparability
becomes strained.' The arguments against the arm's length principle are
pointedly applicable where controlled transactions lose comparability with
uncontrolled transactions.
Michael Patton described the difficulty in applying nontransaction-based methods to a controlled transaction where comparable
data is insufficient or nonexistent."3 "It's kind of like trying to determine
how many angels could dance on the head of that pin if there really were
angels that could dance on the heads of pins."' In these cases, the arm's
length principle is a bad tax.
2. Advance Pricing Agreements
The tax community's response to the ineffectiveness of the arm's
length principle is the APA.'15 However, APAs have some of Adam
Smith's marks of a bad tax system too. Although APA's probably do not
encourage tax evasion, they enlarge the tax bureaucracy. APAs are a
second tier in the IRS's enforcement brigade. They are also a quasi-audit
for the taxpayer requiring time and expense that "obstruct[s] the industry
of the people."'
Additionally, an APA exposes the taxpayer to "much
unnecessary trouble" where formulary apportionment is a less restrictive

149.

ADAMS, supra note 1.

150.

OECD Report, supra note 5, at 324 para. 25.

151.

See discussion supra part II.B.2.

152.

See discussion supra part III.A.

153.

Franko, supra note 111, at 5.

154.

Id.

155. See discussion supra part I.C.3.
156.

ADAMS, supra note 1, at 286.
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alternative.'57 APAs move transfer pricing rules from worse to bad. APAs
are the modern version of the tax enforcement measures Imperial Spain
enacted in the face of massive tax avoidance. Spain's "crackdown was
about as effective as putting gasoline on a smoldering fire."' 58
C. Global Formulary Apportionment as an Alternative to the Arm's
Length Standard
Global formulary apportionment is a realistic alternative to the
arm's length principle for appropriate transactions. 9 MNE groups which
create knowledge and information that add value to our society face
transfer pricing issues that preclude arm's length comparability. The
OECD acknowledges that MNE groups are increasingly engaged in
transactions where they are involved in the "integration of highly
specialized goods, in unique intangibles, and/or in the provision of
specialised services."' ' 6 Transaction-based methods are unworkable for
these types of transactions, yet profit and other methods are often just as
difficult.' 6' The pitfalls of the arm's length standard begin when a
controlled transaction loses comparability with uncontrolled transactions.
For example, the arm's length standard retreats from tax parity. 62
Administrative burdens increase for both the tax administrator and
taxpayer.'6 3 There is less certainty about the appropriate transfer price
methodology. There is also greater exposure to the risk of audit and
double taxation. '6 As a result, an APA is likely.
Even though the OECD and section 482 recognize the limitations
of the arm's length principle for certain transactions, both sets of rules rely
on alternatives that emphasize labels over rational tax principles.16 Some
practitioners contend that profit methods have diluted the arm's length
principle to the extent that the international consensus for the arm's length

157. Id.
158.

Id. at 197.

159. See discussion supra part III.D.
160.

OECD Report, supra note 5, at 324 para. 25; see also discussion infra part II.A.3.

161.

See discussion supra part III.B.3.

162.

See discussion supra part III.A.1.

163.

See discussion supra part III.A.3.

164.

Id.

165. The OECD expressly disparages profit methods. Section 482 implicitly favors the CUP
method and the CUTM over profit methods. Yet, both the OECD and the United States Treasury
categorically reject alternative global formulary methods. See discussion supra parts III.B.3., C.2.
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principle is only "superficial."" The OECD and United States Treasury's
rejection of the unitary approach is formalistic and dogmatic." 7
Global formulary apportionment eliminates many of the problems
associated with the arm's length principle.
Comparable uncontrolled
transactions are unnecessary for formulary apportionment. Administrative
burdens, uncertainty, and tax evasion can be reduced by the unitary
approach.
Also, the risk of double taxation under formulary
apportionment is no greater than the risk of double taxation under the
arm's length principle.'l Global formulary apportionment should be an
alternative method for transactions where it advances rational tax
principles.
D. A Continuum of Transfer PricingMethods
Transfer pricing rules should be a continuum of methods from the
CUP method to formulary apportionment. One end of the spectrum should
continue to emphasize transaction-based methods for the vast majority of
cases. The other end of the spectrum should use a global formulary
method for transactions that fail to meet an acceptable level of
comparability with uncontrolled transactions. The OECD should take the
position that there are several transfer pricing methods with strengths and
weaknesses for different transactions. It should also define acceptable
levels of comparability for particular methods. The OECD should outline
the components of a global formulary method for transactions that cannot
be reliably compared to uncontrolled data. In addition, the OECD should
define global formula for various industries and provide the framework for
international consensus for creating global formulary methods.
While the transfer pricing continuum resolves some issues, it raises
others. The task of achieving international consensus and uniform
application of a global formulary method will be formidable, but
formidability is not new to the. present transfer pricing system.
69
International cooperation on these issues is in the self-interest of nations.
Arnold Weiss and Ferenc Molnar, and members of Arent, Fox, Kintner,
Plotkin & Kahn, warn that "[w]ithout a measure of uniformity and
predictability in the tax treatment of international operations, such operations
will fail to achieve their maximum potential, and to a parallel extent, the

166. Turro, supra note 86, at 5.
167. See discussion supra part III.B.3., C.1.
168. Barclays Bank v. Franchise Board of California, 114 S.Ct. at 2279; see also supra part
I.A.
169. WEISS & MOLNAR, supra note 6, at 108.
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potential prosperity of nations will be tempered."' 70 The United States
Treasury should pioneer regulations that define the transfer pricing
continuum and global formulary methods. The United States should take
the leadership role in the OECD to promote international cooperation
toward "uniformity and predictability" for international transfer pricing
7
rules. '
VI. CONCLUSION
The primary goal of the transfer pricing continuum is to interject
rational tax principles into the international transfer pricing debate.
Rational tax principles suggest a more pragmatic approach to resolving
transfer pricing issues. Debate on these issues should be guided by our
shared understanding for good tax principles, rather than the present
conventional wisdom of the tax community.
Athens, the largest and most powerful city in ancient Greece, was
the chief administrator of the Delian League. 7 2 The League was a defense
alliance to which weak cities paid a compulsory tribute tax in exchange for
protection."3 Aristides the Just was the League's first tax assessor.' The
biographer Plutarch, described Aristides taxes:
[H]e drew up the list of assessments not only with
scrupulous integrity and justice but also in such a way that
all states felt they had been justly and fairly taxed ...
[The cities] desired Aristides of the Athenian and gave him
command, surveying the country and revenue, to assess
everyone according to ability and worth .... "
The time of Aristides was a "golden age" for Athens and its allies." 76 If we
too are to experience a golden age, then our tax systems must be just for
both tax administrators and taxpayers.
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ADAMS, supra note 1, at 55. The Delian League's name was changed to the Athenian

League when the Treasury moved to the Parthenon in Athens. Id. at 62.
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